-Prof. Dr. Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă-
Introduction
Moldova is one of the nine countries currently in the EU’s formal accession process. The small country’s path toward EU membership has passed through significant transformations over the past two decades. Except the complicated situation of the break-away region Transnistria, Moldova remains a relatively strong candidate, with a pro-European government that has made significant progress required for a fast-track accession. But the relations evolved in ambivalent ways over the years. Initially Moldova-EU relations were marked by significant achievements and recognition in the first years of the Eastern Partnership, then they marked by setbacks and in the end by accelerating its process of Association after 2014. Finally, Moldova was profoundly affected by the war in Ukraine. Despite security threats and tens of thousands of Urkainian refugees, the war in Ukraine brought also some unexpected positive evolutions in Moldova -that reached a peak in 2023 with the formal invitation from the European Council to start the accession processes.
This article will first summarize Moldova’s relations with the European Union in a chronological manner, tracing its path from association in the Eastern Partnership to current candidate status. Then, it will look closer to the changes brought by the war in Ukraine and their implications for the specific case of Moldova. Finally, it will look into the future prospects of Moldova-EU relations in the years to come.
Moldova’s journey from the ‘poster child’ of the Eastern Partnership to stagnation and loss of interest
Relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union (EU) started at a formal level only in the 2000s, with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that was signed in 1998, and that came into force in 1999. This was the first step towards Moldova’s future path to European integration, that established a framework for closer political and economic cooperation. Things changed significantly after the EU issued its first Security Strategy in December 2003, under the leadership of at Javier Solana. This strategic document allowed the EU to affirm its desire to be a global actor and allowed for a redefinition its relations with its neighbors. Consequently, in 2004, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), where Moldova was also included together with other 15 countries. In the aftermath of the war in Georgia (August 2008), the EU was clearly impacted by the changing strategic environment and Russia’s aggressiveness in the ex-Soviet space. In these conditions the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (the EaP) which added a specific Eastern dimension to the ENP. Promoted initially by Sweden and Poland, the EaP included the EU, its Member States and six Eastern European Partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It aimed to strengthen and deepen the political and economic relations between the EU, its Member States and the partner countries, as well as supports sustainable reform processes in EaP countries.
The 6 countries were offered the possibility to cooperate closely with the EU at various levels, but there was no membership perspective attached. This aspect was criticized from the beginning by some countries – such as Moldova or Ukraine – who while having more pro-European forces in power wanted to be offered also a membership perspective. It must be highlighted here that once Romania became an EU member in 2007 it started to advocate inside the EU Council the need for the EU to open a membership perspective for Moldova. But this was not possible at that time. Over the years, the EaP has been instrumental in bringing the EU and the partner countries closer together, combining both bilateral and multilateral tracks. The EU reactions towards Moldova were again triggered by Russia’s aggressive actions, namely the illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, followed by the Eastern part of Ukraine that plunged into an armed conflict spurred on by Russian-backed separatists. These events paved the way for closer relations through the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) for both Moldova and Ukraine. Moldova signed the AA in 2014 and entered into force in July 2016. In April 2014 Moldova also signed a visa liberalisation agreement for short-term stays with the EU, which had a direct impact on its citizens by fostering tourism, business relations, education for youth and people-to-people contacts. This placed Moldova in the so-called ‘Associated Trio’ group, together with Georgia and Ukraine, and openly expressed their interest to get closer to the EU. This was a major breakthrough in Moldova-EU relations, as it meant taking the process to a totally different level of cooperation.
It is also important to mention here that under Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s administration (2009–2012), the Republic of Moldova used to be portrayed as a ‘poster child’, or in other words – a success story of the EaP, which ended abruptly in 2013 at the outbreak of Moldova’s political crisis and the return to power of the Communist Party. The period between 2014 and 2021 was marked by stagnation and not notable evolution, despite the fact that Moldova was committed to reforming its domestic policies on the basis of EU laws and practice. After entering into force of the AA and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (February 2022) the country was marked by instability, setbacks and a protracted political and economic crisis. An important political change brought Moldova back on track – its first ever female President. In the early parliamentary elections of 11 July 2021, pro-EU President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a resounding victory. This shift strengthened Moldova’s political and economic ties with the EU. In fact, we may argue that Maia Sandu played a crucial role in mobilizing international support for Moldova (during the second part of the Covid-19 pandemic and at the beginning of the war in Ukraine), actively participating in international forums and securing the necessary political and financial support to face these challenges. Her pro-European stance and commitment to democratic values were decisive in maintaining a clear direction towards EU integration.
War at its borders, Geopolitical Challenges and the Acceleration of European Integration
The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, had a major impact on regional security and directly influenced Moldova’s foreign policy. In response to the crisis, Moldova adopted a clear stance of solidarity with Ukraine and oriented itself towards the EU, marking a firm distancing from Russian influence. Moldova’s proximity to Ukraine and the fact they share a border stretching over 939 km has made Moldova particularly vulnerable to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and this threat continues to this day.
On March 3, 2022, the Republic of Moldova officially submitted its application for EU membership. This step reflected not only a political desire, but also a strategic necessity for security and stability, given the increasingly tense geopolitical context of the war. As such, in the tragic context of the war in Ukraine, Moldova took the historic step of formally applying for EU membership – a prospect which was not possible when it was simply an associated country in the EaP. The crucial geopolitical changes happening in Europe in the first part of 2022 made it possible that at the European Council meeting of 23 June 2022 open a new strategic phase in EU-Moldova relations. As such, in just four months, the EU decided something unpredictable before – to grant both Moldova and Ukraine candidate status for EU membership. This decision was the result of a rapid but thorough assessment of the commitments and reforms made by the government in Chișinău. Candidate status was offered to Moldova together with heightened expectations from the EU, which emphasized the need to continue reforms in the areas of justice, anti-corruption efforts, and human rights protection – some of the country’s most vulnerable points.
The government led by Natalia Gavrilița, in office at the beginning of 2022, prioritized European integration by adopting reform measures in the judiciary, combating corruption, and improving the business environment. The government headed by Gavrilița, which operated between August 2021 and February 2023, faced several shortcomings and major challenges that ultimately led to her resignation. In this period, Moldova experienced very high inflation, reaching record levels of over 30%. This led to increased costs for food, energy, and other essential goods, which generated discontent among the population. Additionally, due to the war in Ukraine, Moldova hosted a significant number of Ukrainian refugees. Although the government was praised for its humanitarian efforts, this crisis put significant pressure on the country’s resources, and the government’s ability to cope with this massive influx of people was called into question. To make things even worse, several protests were organized by the pro-Russian opposition of the country, accusing the government of corruption, incompetence, and the inability to manage economic and social crises. These protests created constant pressure on the government and undermined public confidence in its ability to govern effectively. The lack of significant progress in reforming the justice system and state institutions was one of the main criticisms directed at the government.
As a result of all mounting tensions, on 10 February 2023, Prime Minister Gavrilița stepped down and Dorin Recean was approved as the new Prime Minister. The current government continues to pursue a pro-EU agenda, with a new focus on national security and on accelerating the implementation of reforms as part of the process of joining the EU. Additionally, the government intensified judicial reforms, a key aspect for advancing the accession negotiations.
Good news and bad news: hybrid attacks, internal instability and speedy preparations for accession negotiations
Between 2022 and 2023, the Republic of Moldova was the target of hybrid attacks from Russia, including disinformation campaigns, attempts to destabilize the political landscape by supporting pro-Russian forces in the country, and economic pressure, especially in the energy sector. The disinformation campaigns aimed primarily at undermining public trust in the authorities in Chișinău and in the country’s European path. Disinformation was spread through various media channels and social networks, often trying to exacerbate internal tensions and fuel protests against the pro-European government.
In terms of political destabilization, these efforts included support for pro-Russian political parties and social movements, which organized protests and actions intended to undermine the government. For example, in 2023, large-scale protests were organized in Chișinău, backed by pro-Russian political formations that sharply criticized the government’s foreign policy and its pro-European orientation. Regarding economic pressure, Russia used the energy sector as a tool of influence, reducing and later suspending natural gas deliveries to Republic of Moldova, triggering energy crises and price increases. This had a significant impact on Republic of Moldova’s already vulnerable economy and on the well-being of its population.
However, Moldovan authorities, supported by EU and NATO partners, managed to respond firmly to these challenges. The government in Chișinău implemented measures to combat disinformation, including promoting media literacy and collaborating with international organizations to identify and counter false narratives. The licenses of several media entities funded by Russia were suspended. As for the energy crisis, Moldova diversified its supply sources, including purchasing gas from Romania and other European countries, reducing its dependence on Russia.
It is worth underlining the fact that in the second half of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, the Chișinău government intensified preparations for the official opening of EU accession negotiations. These preparations included reviewing national legislation to align it with the EU acquis, strengthening administrative capacities, and preparing negotiation chapters. In this context, the EU continued to provide technical and financial support to facilitate this complex process. An this is how on July 20, 2024, the Republic of Moldova officially began accession negotiations with the EU, a crucial milestone in its European journey. The negotiations will cover multiple chapters, each analyzing in detail the country’s compliance with European standards and identifying areas where further reforms are needed. Now, the EU is by far Moldova’s main trading partner, accounting for 58.8% of the country’s exports and 43.9% of its imports. and the largest investor in the country.
Future prospects for Moldova advancing on the path to European integration
As shown, Moldova’s relations with the EU have gone through very heavy transformations – most visibly from 2004, when it was included in the ENP, then when it was the poster child of the Eastern Partnership after 2009, in 2014 when it became an associated country until its current status in 2024 of candidate country in membership negotiations with the EU. Moldova’s status evolved rapidly and significantly after 2022, against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine and in an extremely volatile geopolitical context. Overall, over the last years, especially since Maia Sandu became President, the Republic of Moldova has shown commitment and resilience in the face of challenges. Its European future, though still uncertain, is closer than ever, beginning a negotiation process that could fundamentally transform the country’s destiny in the coming years. In fact, Moldovan authorities announced that they aim to join the EU by 2030.
But the opening of formal EU negotiations was not the single major milestone for Moldova. On October 20th 2024, all eyes will be on Moldova because the country will simultaneously hold its presidential elections and a crucial referendum on the country’s accession to the EU. These two events form a strategic confluence that is expected to play in favor of incumbent President Maia Sandu. This event is of crucial importance for Moldova’s European future, because If the referendum fails to engage sufficient voter turnout, it could not only undermine the current government but also potentially benefit pro-Russian factions in upcoming parliamentary elections.
Let us briefly look into the future prospects of Moldova-EU relations in the years to come. Although the Republic of Moldova has made significant progress, the European integration process remains complex and full of challenges. In a region marked by instability and internal pressures, the success of this path will depend on the continuation of reforms, maintaining political stability and national security, and constant support from the EU. Moreover, the entanglements between Russia and Moldova’s breakaway state of Transnistria (where Russia has military presence on the ground) will continue to complicate the country’s bid to join the EU for the years to come. The Transnistria situation will continue to remain a big challenge for Moldova and a reintegration solution similar to the one used in Cyprus (that allowed the country to join the EU in 2004) would be expected. What we clearly observed after 2022 is that at the EU level, there’s political will to bring Moldova in the Union despite its territorial difficulties.
Both politically and economically, Moldova needs to keep up with the speedy EU-driven reforms, to focus its efforts on national security and reducing energy dependence on the Russian Federation, benefiting from EU support, which provided substantial financial assistance for diversifying energy sources and for economic stabilization. The next years will be marked by intense negotiations between Moldova and EU, that need to be dedicated to bringing the candidate countries’ legislation in line with EU laws and standards. This will imply implementing very heavy judicial, administrative and economic reforms, which as we have seen in previous enlargement waves require stable institutions and commitment on the EU path. Looking these days at the formation of the second Von der Leyen Commission, we shouldn’t lose out of sight the fact that political dynamics within the EU will also play a crucial role in maintaining the momentum for this process or slowing it down in the years to come.
Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă is a researcher specialised in EU Foreign and Security Policy and writer. She is born in Bucharest and studied Political Science at the National University of Political Science and Public Administration (SNSPA) in Bucharest (Romania). She obtained her PhD at the same university with a thesis on the Europeanization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and held various research fellowships in Berlin, Ljubljana, Graz and Warsaw. Currently, she works as Associate Professor, PhD advisor and Director of the Centre of European Studies of SNSPA. In her early career, Miruna worked as an intern Political officer for the Romanian Embassy in Sarajevo (2013) and the Delegation of the European Union in Prishtina (2014). Her most recent publication is titled «Reconfiguring EU Peripheries: Political Elites, Contestation and Geopolitical Shifts” an open-access collective volume co-edited with Radu Alexandru Cucută and Ali Onur Ozcelik (Helsinki University Press, 2024).
This article is part of the project Hablamos de Europa, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of the Government of Spain.
