En Hablamos de Europa

The story of North Macedonia’s path towards membership in the European Union is perhaps the best argument that EU enlargement is not necessarily a merit-based process, but primarily a political process which can be overburdened with issues which have nothing to do with membership criteria.

Hindered by not just one, but two different bilateral disputes with neighbouring EU member states  – Greece and Bulgaria – for more than two decades, the story of EU accession process of North Macedonia tests the optimism of even the strongest supporters of EU enlargement, and fuels frustration and cynicism concerning EU integration across the Western Balkans.

North Macedonia was actually the first among the Western Balkans 6 to be granted candidate status for EU membership in 2005, just one year after the then-frontrunner in the Western Balkans, Croatia. But while Croatia managed to join the EU already in 2013, North Macedonia still remains quite far from that goal.

To be precise, North Macedonia is yet to even begin its accession negotiations in earnest after formally starting the process in 2022, hindered by its dispute with Bulgaria. Currently, even that step appears to be elusive and future of North Macedonia’s EU bid quite uncertain.

Dispute with Greece and rising authoritarianism (Greek veto on Euro-Atlantic integration fuels illiberalism)

The dispute with neighbouring Greece concerning the country’s then-constitutional name The Republic of Macedonia complicated the young country’s UN membership bid already in the early 1990s, and later significantly hurt its EU and NATO membership bids.

The country managed to join the UN under the provisional name “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM), but the Greek veto in the late 2000s prevented it from opening EU accession negotiations or joining NATO.

The stalemate in EU and NATO accession of North Macedonia went hand in hand with worrying developments at home. Presenting himself as a young reformer, Nikola Gruevski, the leader of the nationalist centre-right party VMRO-DPMNE who became prime minister in 2006, established an increasingly illiberal regime after the Greek veto put the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration to a halt.

Capturing the state, Gruevski’s government used nationalist rhetoric and revisionist narratives about ancient origins of ethnic Macedonians for internal political purposes, but also provoked Greece further. Thus, the result was the deterioration of democratic institutions at home coupled with almost complete standstill in Euro-Atlantic integration and resolution of the bilateral dispute with Greece.

Gruevski and his VMRO-DPMNE were removed from power in 2017 after a few turbulent years in which mass protests were followed by EU-mediated inter-party dialogue aimed at improving electoral conditions and normalizing political life. The transition of power was threatened by the storming of the parliament by VMRO DPMNE supporters and physical attacks on the new leadership, but the violence did not prevent the regime change.

The new government led by prime minister Zoran Zaev and his centre-left party SDSM made progress in Euro-Atlantic integration one of its top priorities. Already in 2017, the new government signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria – another EU member state with which bilateral disputes represented an important obstacle – and made progress in the dialogue with Greece.

The two governments reached the Prespa Agreement in June 2018, according to which North Macedonia would start using the name “North Macedonia” both internationally and at home, thus bringing an end to both the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” and the provisional name “FYROM”. The change was enacted after a non-binding referendum in September 2018, in which 94% of voters supported the name change, but with a low turnout of 37%, significantly below the 50% needed for it to be formally successful.

Needless to say, the government and the citizens supported the name change due to expectations that it would bring about long-awaited progress in EU accession. However, this painful concession was not going to be rewarded, and the opening of accession negotiations would remain out of reach.

Painful concessions not rewarded

The first cold shower came in October 2019 when France opposed opening accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania (another Western Balkan candidate state North Macedonia was grouped with). French officials cited various reasons for this new veto – from lack of progress in rule of law to dissatisfaction with the results of the current enlargement framework and the need to reform the EU before moving forward with enlargement, but the real reasons probably had to with opposition to enlargement at home and the upcoming French local elections.

The decision not to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania was met with fierce criticism, especially as the former made a very painful and politically costly decision to change its name for the sake of progress towards EU membership, sending a clear message throughout the region that sacrifices for the sake of EU accession won’t be rewarded.

France soon opened a debate about reforming the enlargement methodology and offered its own proposal, after which the relevant EU institutions adopted the revised enlargement methodology in March 2020. North Macedonia’s entry into NATO in the same month, previously also delayed for more than a decade by the Greek veto, was hardly an adequate consolation prize.

The return of bilateral disputes – Bulgaria’s turn to veto

Unfortunately for North Macedonia, its famous dispute with Greece over its name was not the only major bilateral issue the country had with its EU neighbours. Even though Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the newly independent Macedonia under its constitutional name, the two countries remained in dispute over several issues related to history, language and minority rights.

Bulgaria may have recognized the state, but did not recognize a distinct Macedonian ethnicity or language, considering Macedonia to be its historical territory. Bulgaria was not satisfied with the perceived “anti-Bulgarian campaign” in North Macedonia, as well as the official Macedonian interpretation of its history and language as entirely distinct from Bulgarian.

Zoran Zaev’s government signed a friendship agreement with Bulgaria already in 2017 and the eastern neighbour did not oppose North Macedonia’s progress on its EU path. However, the French veto in 2019 destroyed the momentum that came after the Prespa Agreement and opened space for Bulgaria to present its own demands. Unsatisfied with the lack of agreement on language and history, the Bulgarian government opposed the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia in late 2020.

To break the deadlock, France – now playing a seemingly constructive role – proposed a compromise solution where North Macedonia would accept having a requirement to recognize Bulgarians as a minority within its constitution as part of its formal EU accession process so that its EU accession process could continue.

North Macedonia’s government and parliament reluctantly agreed to this proposal, an agreement was reached between the two governments and accession talks with North Macedonia were formally opened in July 2022. However, the lack of political consensus in the country to enact the necessary constitutional changes meant that North Macedonia’s EU accession process would once again hit a wall.

Thus, North Macedonia once again had its EU accession process substantially delayed by a bilateral dispute with a neighbouring EU member state.

(Is there) a way forward?

It is in these circumstances that the opposition VMRO DPMNE managed to convincingly beat the incumbent SDSM in May 2024 parliamentary and presidential election, after which VMRO DPMNE leader Hristijan Mickoski became the prime minister, while law professor Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova assumed the office of president.

Thus, VMRO returned to power after 7 years in which SDSM did not manage to launch EU accession negotiations despite notable compromises and concessions to its EU neighbours, including the name change and the acceptance to once again amend North Macedonia’s constitution. The victory of VMRO DPMNE was undoubtedly the result of other issues as well, but the importance of the failure of SDSM to make progress in EU accession was certainly a major factor of its downfall.

The new government does not seem likely to change back the name of the country and thus endanger the relations with Greece. However, it is opposed to amending the constitution and adding Bulgarians as a national minority in these circumstances, asking for a new agreement where this would be done only at the time of North Macedonia’s entry into the EU, fearing that otherwise Bulgaria could put new demands along the way. With Bulgaria’s internal turmoil not receding and the apparent lack of readiness of Skopje to once again concede to neighbours’ demands, the way forward is not clear.

Meanwhile, Albania was finally decoupled from North Macedonia in October 2024, opening the first group of chapters within accession negotiations under Cluster 1. This decision was certainly good news for Albania, but most probably not for North Macedonia, who now remains in a limbo. The support for EU integration in North Macedonia remains relatively high, with 68% of citizens in favour of EU membership, but a lack of progress for 20 years due to reasons which have nothing to do with membership criteria put these beliefs under a huge test.

It is also unclear where will political will to make new concessions come from, having in mind that the EU already failed to reward Zoran Zaev’s government with accession talks after the Prespa Agreement and the controversial name change. With apparently low chances for the issue to be resolved in Skopje and Sofia, it seems to be up to other EU capitals to find a way to resolve the deadlock.

Nikola Burazer (Никола Буразер) is a Serbian political scientist, journalist, program director of Center for Contemporary Politics and executive editor of European Western Balkans.

This article is part of the project Hablamos de Europa, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of the Government of Spain.

REREFENCES:

1 With the constitutional name „The Republic of Macedonia“ and internationally recognized as „the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“ (FYROM)

2 Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско национално единство (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity)

3 Социјалдемократски сојуз на Македонија (Socialdemocratic Union of Macedonia)

4 “Macedonia and Bulgaria sign Treaty on friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation”, European Western Balkans, 1 August 2017, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/08/01/macedonia-bulgaria-sign-treaty-friendship-good-neighbourliness-cooperation/

5 Државна изборна комисија, „Извештај за конечните резултати од гласањето на Референдумот на државно ниво, 30 септември 2018“.

6 “[EWB Interview] Mondoloni: France is for opening negotiations, but only after conditions are fulfilled”, European Western Balkans, 18 October 2019, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/10/18/ewb-interview-mondoloni-france-is-for-opening-negotiations-but-only-after-conditions-are-fulfilled/

7 EU blocks Albania and North Macedonia membership bids, BBC, 18 October 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50100201

8 “France under fire for ‘historic error’ of blocking Balkan EU hopefuls”, Reuters, 18 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/france-under-fire-for-historic-error-of-blocking-balkan-eu-hopefuls-idUSKBN1WX1CW/

9 “North Macedonia Backs Compromise To Clear EU Path; Accession Talks Set For July 19”, Radio Free Europe, 16 July 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/north-macedonia-france-proposal-eu-membership-debate/31946083.html

10 “North Macedonia’s right-wing opposition scores victory in elections”, Voice of America, 9 May 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/north-macedonia-right-wing-opposition-scores-victory-in-elections/7604923.html

11 “North Macedonia PM Voices Frustration Over ‘Humiliating’ EU Accession Demands”, Balkan Insight, 20 September 2024, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/09/20/north-macedonia-pm-voices-frustration-over-humiliating-eu-accession-demands/

12 “Balkan Support for EU Accession High, Except in Serbia – Survey”, Balkan Insight, 14 May 2024, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/05/14/balkan-support-for-eu-accession-high-except-in-serbia-survey/

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