-Prof. Dr. Bahri Yilmaz-
Introduction
Since the Second World War, Türkiye’s international relations have been determined mainly by three interdependent factors: national security, economic cooperation, and the full integration of the country into Western civilization. These facts led to Türkiye’s membership in NATO in 1952[1] and its application to become a candidate country of the EU in 1959 and 1987. Years later, Ankara was accepted into the negotiation process as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, and the negotiations began on October 3, 2005. Unfortunately, negotiations have stalled since 2018, and Turkey is still in the waiting room in Brussels.
This article will first summarize Türkiye’s historic relations with the European Union, tracing its path from association to candidate status. Then, it will look at the arguments both for and against Türkiye’s accession today. Finally, it will look into possible scenarios for the future of EU-Türkiye relations.
Relations between the European Union and Türkiye: From Association to Candidate
The story of Türkiye-EU relations began with the applications of Türkiye and Greece for membership in the former European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. Rather than membership, the Association Agreement (also known as the Ankara Agreement) with Türkiye was signed in 1963 and came into effect in December 1964. The Association Agreement is based on three main pillars: the Customs Union; the free movement of labor; and financial assistance through financial protocols. However, the Association was not clearly defined in the agreement with regard to how and under what conditions future relations between the two parties would be shaped and deepened. Only Article 28 of the Association Agreement indirectly referred to the possibility of Türkiye’s later entry into the Community through evaluating the country’s overall performance.
In April 1987, the Turkish Government applied for full membership in the EU, again. This followed from a clause in Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, which concedes that “each European country can apply for membership into the EEC.” In December 1989, the EU Commission announced its expected opinion. Türkiye was again denied membership: “As long as economic and political disparities continue to exist, in fact, Turkey could experience serious difficulties in taking on the obligations resulting from the Community’s economic and social policies.”[2]
In 1996, Türkiye joined the Customs Union as the first country to have entered without being a full member of the EU. This means that Türkiye had to completely open its economy to international competition and become a part of the EU’s internal market concerning industrial products. Since 1996, Türkiye has implemented comprehensive legal regulations that are directly linked to the operation of the Customs Union.[3]
At the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999, it was agreed that “the European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Türkiye as noted in the Commission’s progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms toward complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Türkiye is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states.”[4]
With the EU Commission and the EU leaders persuaded that Türkiye had made sufficient progress on fulfilling the so-called “Copenhagen Political criteria,” negotiations began accession process on October 3, 2005. Türkiye’s EU accession process is conducted in 35 chapters in the context of the Negotiation Framework in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. However, the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels notably began with several other preconditions.
The EU, for the first time, made explicit that it would suspend negotiations “in the case of a serious and persistent breach in a candidate state of the principles of European values.” Thus, it came as no surprise that the EU would suspend Türkiye’s EU accession process on this basis over 13 years later.
The European Commission summarizes the reasons for its current view of Türkiye in its Turkey Report 2023. On the one hand, the Commission describes the country as a «leading partner»; on the other hand, in its latest progress report, it makes it clear that the conditions for progress in the accession process have not been met—namely, respect for the rule of law, democratic values, and human rights as well as a solution regarding the dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.[5] Interestingly, Brussels has expressed great interest in cooperation in the area of migration and asylum policy: citing the EU-Turkey Statement approved in 2016 as a good example of migration cooperation.[6]
Meanwhile, Türkiye’s economic relations with the bloc are extremely intertwined. The EU is Türkiye’s largest importer of goods and export partner by a significant margin. In 2023, 41% of Türkiye’s exports were destined for the EU, while 29% of its imports originate from the EU, FDI coming from Europe has totaled around USD 120 billion
Today, Türkiye’s main goal is the completion of its political and economic integration process with the EU. Given its historic relations and various forms of cooperation, there are thus many arguments both for and against Türkiye’s EU membership. These arguments and scenarios will be outlined in the next section.
What Are the Arguments against Türkiye’s Full Membership?
Türkiye is “different and the other” from historical, cultural, and religious points of view. Türkiye is not a part of “European Civilization,” which is based on the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations and Christianity, according to Germany historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler.[7] From a geographical point of view Türkiye does not belong to Europe; it cannot be regarded as an integral part of European continent and thus should not be included in the EU.[8]
Türkiye is too poor and too populous. Türkiye’s membership would lead to the destruction of the existing balance of power between various coalitions within the European Union (old/new, big/small, rich/poor, north/south, etc.). With Türkiye’s membership in the EU, the economically poorest country of Europe would be upgraded because of the size of its population to become one of the “big” member states represented in all European institutions, at the same level as Germany and France.[9]
Turkish membership would unleash a wave of labor movement migration from Türkiye to the EU. It is argued that Turkish membership would induce a wave of labor migrants from Türkiye to EU countries. This will decrease the living standards in the EU due to these migrants’ differences in economic position.
Türkiye is too costly. In the case of Turkey’s full membership, the country would become a net recipient due to its low level of economic development.[10]
What Are the Main Arguments for Türkiye’s Full Membership in the EU?
Through Türkiye, the EU can become a global political power. Türkiye already has indisputable geostrategic importance, which would help Brussels establish a political and economic bond.
Turkish membership could help strengthen the EU’s energy security through reducing import dependency on energy. The European energy demand for oil and natural gas can be secured and diversified in transit routes through the supply of energy from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran over Türkiye to Europe.[11]
Türkiye has great economic potential. Türkiye is a member of the G20. While it is the world’s 19th largest economy, it is the 5th largest in Europe.
Türkiye has been regarded as a buffer zone to stop illegal migration. This means that illegal migration from Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Far East to Europe would be stopped with help of the Turkish government. The Commission expects Türkiye to uphold its commitments under the EU-Turkey statement, in line with the European Council conclusions of October 2021, including prevention of irregular migration from land and sea routes, and resuming returns.
Future Scenarios for Türkiye’s International Relations: To Where Is Ankara Running?
Since 1959, the EU has shown only the minimum amount of mutuality and closeness in Türkiye as has been necessary to ensure the bloc’s interests. Over the last decade, EU member states have taken few steps in the direction of Türkiye’s lasting and irreversible integration into the EU. Thus, the EU began to distance itself from Türkiye’s full membership.[12]
On the other side, at times Türkiye was not keenly interested and not fully engaged in becoming a full member of the European Union. Ankara only expressed its membership aspirations rhetorically and only paid lip service to EU values. Successive Turkish governments have not shown enough willingness and readiness to implement the so-called “European values and principles,” on which the Union was founded: the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (Article 6 and 49 of the Treaty of the European Union).
Thus, there are several projections for Türkiye’s future in the EU:
Scenario I, Full membership: For the time being this seems to be a very optimistic view and wishful thinking.
Scenario II, No Membership: Türkiye will not become a member of the European Union. French President Emmanuel Macron has told his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “that there is no chance of progress towards Türkiye joining the European Union at present.”[13]
Scenario III, Privileged Partnership: Türkiye becomes fully integrated into the European Economic Union (Single Market) but not in the Political Union.[14]
Scenario IV, Candidate for ever: The negotiation process between Türkiye and the EU will continue forever without reaching any final decision.
Scenario V, Looking West and Going East: Türkiye moves closer toward the Middle East and toward a possible economic and strategic partnership with Russia and China. Another option is becoming a member of BRICS. Türkiye has already declared its intention to establish a partnership with BRICS.[15]
No one can know today whether Türkiye will ever become a member. A happy outcome of this longstanding relationship is still not in sight. Obviously, Türkiye must undergo fundamental political, economic, and social changes before it could become a member, and such a process of change would take time. The success of the struggle for membership will depend on whether Türkiye and the European Union are ready to proceed together and resolutely in this long and complicated process. What we request and expect from the European Union is a “fair chance” in the negotiations process without any prejudices. Certainly, Ankara and Brussels have much work to do for Türkiye’s full membership to become a reality.
Prof. Dr. Bahri Yilmaz is EU Ad Personam Jean Monnet Professor and Emeritus Professor in Economics at Sabanci University’s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. He worked as the Chief Advisor to the Ministry of State for European Union Affairs in Ankara between 1997 and 2002. He was a visiting fellow at Wolfson and Pembroke College, Cambridge; St. Antony’s College, Oxford; Korean Development Institute (KDI), San Pablo University (CEU) Madrid, Seoul; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin; Institute für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel; European University Institute (EUI), Florence; and the Centre for European Studies (CES), Harvard University.
This article is part of the project Hablamos de Europa, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of the Government of Spain.
[1] See more detailed papers on the topic: Bahri Yilmaz, “The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever?” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #167 (2008), https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Working-Papers-Archives/CES_167.pdf.; Bahri Yilmaz, “Foreign Trade Specialization and International Competitiveness Of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the EU 12,” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #166 (2008), https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Working-Papers-Archives/CES_166.pdf; Bahri Yilmaz, “Turkey’s membership in the EU: realistic or merely wishful?” Harvard International Review (HIR), 2011, http://hir.harvard.edu/turkey-s-membership-in-the-eu-realistic-ormerely-wishful.
[2] Commission of the European Communities, (1989): Commission Opinion on Turkey’s request for Accession to the Community, Brussels, December 20, 1989 [SEC (89) 2290 fin.2]; Eric Rouleau, “The Challenges to Turkey,” Foreign Affairs 72, 5 (1993): 116.
[3] Decision No: 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995, Official Journal of the European Communities, Turkey, February 13, 1996.
[4] Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999.
[5] Key findings of the 2023 Report on Türkiye, Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/key-findings-2023-report-t%C3%BCrkiye_en?s=230
[6] ibid
[7] See Heinrich-August Winkler, “Grenzen der Erweiterung. Die Türkei ist kein Teil des ‘Projects Europa’,” Internationale Politik, 58 (February 2003): 59–66; Heinz Ulrich Wehler, “Das Türken-Problem,” Die Zeit, September 12, 2002.
[8] See Nathalie Tocci, “Report: Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice,” EU-Turkey Relations (2007): 21.
[9] Müftüler Baç Meltem, “Enlarging the European Union: Where Turkey does stand?” TESEV (Istanbul), July (2002): 33–36.
[10] See Dicke Hogo, “Die Beitrittsvertrage der EU-eine Bilanzierung,“ Institute für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, Working Paper 1157, Kiel (2003): 12–23.
[11] See. M. Gareth Winrow, “Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External Actors, and
Turkish Policy in the Caucasus,» Middle East Journal 5, no. 1 (2003): 76–92.
[12] Heinz Kramer, “EC-Turkey Relations: Unfinished for Ever,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen, Working Paper No. 6 (1993).
[13] Macron tells Erdogan: “No chance of Turkey joining EU, BBC, January 5, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42586108.
[14] Karl Theodor zu Gutenberg, “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der EU- eine Privilegierte Partnerschaft,” Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Aktuelle Analysen 33 (2004). Wolfgang Schäuble and David L. Phillips, “Talking Turkey,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (November/December (2004).
[15] “Kremlin welcomes Turkey’s reported desire to join BRICS,” Reuters, June 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-welcomes-turkeys-reported-desire-join-brics-2024-06-04/.
